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The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a multilateral free-trade agreement which New Zealand 
became a party to in 2016. This article focuses on the inconsistencies that arise between the language 
of the TPP and New Zealand law, with respect to data exclusivity regimes. Compliance with the TPP 
seems to entail an extension to the terms of data exclusivity for both biologics and small-molecule 
pharmaceuticals. This may have the effect of impeding access to medicines by delaying the entry of 
competition into the market. In particular the underlying rationale behind the biologic data exclusivity 
provisions appears to be the protection of American corporate profits rather than the stimulation of 
innovation or the long-term improvement of access to healthcare. As a result, these provisions are not 
in New Zealand's interest and if implemented into law they may be economically detrimental.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on 4 February 2016 following six years of 
negotiations.1 Its 12 member nations from the Asia-Pacific region collectively produce 40 per cent of 
global economic output, with a combined population of 800 million.2 As a member, New Zealand 
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1  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee International treaty examination of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (4 May 2016) at 2. This estimate includes the United States, which withdrew from the 
Partnership in January 2017. 
2  At 2. 
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stands to benefit economically from this arrangement. Estimates by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee predict that by 2030 the TPP will add an additional $2.7 billion a year to New 
Zealand's GDP.3 New Zealand's entry into this free trade agreement has been further rationalised on 
the basis that opting out would put the country at a significant competitive disadvantage, particularly 
given the large quantity of exports New Zealand makes to TPP members.4 The TPP however, has 
attracted substantial criticism. The negotiations have been shrouded in a veil of secrecy, providing 
limited opportunity for public input.5 Moreover, the extensive involvement of multi-national 
corporations has raised serious concerns, particularly in light of this secrecy and lack of public 
involvement.6  
At the time of signing in February 2016, the United States was a committed party. However, 
following the election of President Donald Trump, the United States promptly withdrew from the 
Partnership.7 Despite this development, former New Zealand Prime Minister John Key has 
acknowledged the possibility that the trade deal could go ahead even without the United States, stating 
that a TPP with the remaining 11 countries would still deliver two thirds of the anticipated economic 
benefit.8 As of 22 March 2017 it remains to be seen whether the agreement will take effect, and in 
what form it might do so. The focus of this article therefore is to provide a close analysis of the TPP's 
data exclusivity provisions as they currently stand, and examine their implications within the New 
Zealand context.  
This article will begin by outlining the role of data exclusivity and patents within the 
pharmaceutical industry. The next part will provide a breakdown on the relevant sections of the TPP, 
followed by an analysis of their potential implications on innovation and access to medicines in New 
Zealand. This will include a discussion on the interplay between intellectual property and the class of 
drugs known as biologics. The article will then examine the consequences of the TPP's data 
exclusivity requirements in the biologics context. Lastly, there will be an analysis of the scope of the 
  
3  At 2. 
4  At 2. 
5  Trevor Timm "The TTIP and the TPP trade deals: enough of the secrecy" The Guardian (online ed, London, 
4 May 2016). 
6  Deborah Gleeson and others "How the transnational pharmaceutical industry pursues its interests through 
international trade and investment agreements: a case study of the Trans Pacific Partnership" in Alice de Jonge 
and Roman Tomasic (eds) Research Handbook on Transnational Corporations (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2017) 223. 
7  "Trump withdraws US from Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal" Aljazeera (online ed, 24 January 2017). 
8  "Donald Trump to quit TPP on first day in office" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 22 
November 2016). 
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discretion conferred upon TPP members to relax intellectual property safeguards in order to protect 
public health.  
In conclusion, the TPP requires increased data exclusivity periods. Moreover, these changes could 
have detrimental effects on access to medicines. Whether this is the case depends entirely on the 
interpretation taken by the New Zealand Government.  
II PATENTS, DATA EXCLUSIVITY AND REGULATORY 
APPROVAL WITHIN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
It is common practice for pharmaceutical manufacturers to protect their inventions with patents. 
A patent allows its holder to exclude others from making or selling the patented pharmaceutical during 
the protected period,9 which is 20 years in New Zealand.10 The monopoly granted to patent holders 
can be described as providing an incentive for innovation.11 Additionally, patent registration requires 
pharmaceutical companies to disclose information concerning the development of the relevant 
pharmaceutical.12 This requirement to disclose scientific information stimulates the dissemination of 
knowledge, from which the public can ultimately benefit.  
Once the patent term has expired, competitors may enter the market and offer generic versions of 
the drug, which tend to be cheaper. A fundamental premise of the capitalist economic system is that 
"all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate cost, 
are favourably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers".13 In the New 
Zealand context, cheaper drug prices means that Pharmac, the government agency responsible for the 
funding of medicines, may be able to subsidise or fund new types of treatment, which were previously 
too expensive. 
Before anyone can market a pharmaceutical however, regulatory approval is required to confirm 
that the product is safe and effective. In New Zealand, the regulatory body responsible for this function 
is Medsafe. For pioneer compounds a comprehensive analysis of drug safety and efficacy is required. 
The necessary clinical trials typically involve 3–4 phases of clinical testing. Phase I trials are usually 
carried out on a small sample of healthy volunteers to investigate the fundamental pharmacological 
effects of the drug.14 Phase II trials typically involve moderately sized sample groups, with tests aimed 
  
9  Patents Act 2013, s 18. 
10  Section 20. 
11  Susy Frankel Intellectual Property in New Zealand (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at 391. 
12  Patents Act 2013, s 39. 
13  National Society of Professional Engineers v United States 435 US 679 (1978) at 695–696. 
14  Chris Frampton and Shaun Holt "Clinical Trials – An Overview" (27 June 2016) Health Quality and Safety 
Commission New Zealand <www.hqsc.govt.nz> at 2. 
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at generating preliminary efficacy and safety data.15 Phase III trials involve a test of efficacy relative 
to a control or placebo drug on a large population.16 Phase IV trials are generally of the nature of post-
marketing monitoring and surveillance programmes.17 The majority of clinical trials are conducted in 
markets such as the United States, Western Europe and Japan.18 
Conducting a full set of clinical trials can be extremely expensive.19 However, where regulatory 
approval is sought for a generic form of an off-patent drug an abbreviated approval process is often 
available. In New Zealand the requirement for lengthy clinical trials can be bypassed if it is established 
that the generic drug is bioequivalent to a pioneer drug, which has been previously approved by 
Medsafe.20 According to Medsafe two products are bioequivalent "when the bioavailabilities of two 
different formulations of the same pharmaceutical form and containing the same active ingredient are 
shown to be comparable after administration of the same dose".21 Bioavailability may be defined as 
"the rate and extent of absorption of the active ingredient in a medicine into systemic circulation".22 
Under this approach, bioequivalence studies may be conducted instead of comprehensive clinical 
trials, allowing for cost savings.  
Data exclusivity regulations prevent generic manufacturers from relying on the clinical data 
submitted by pioneer drug manufacturers, in order to obtain regulatory approval for their generic 
versions of the drug.23 The current term of data exclusivity in New Zealand is five years from the date 
that the application for regulatory approval of the pioneer pharmaceutical was received.24 During this 
period generic producers must conduct their own clinical trials in full if they wish to obtain regulatory 
  
15  At 2. 
16  At 2. 
17  At 2. 
18  Garth Tierney and Silvia Zieher "Key Strategies for Effective Globalization of Clinical Trials" (10 January 
2017) Pharmaceutical Outsourcing <www.pharmoutsourcing.com>. 
19  Aylin Sertkaya and others "Key cost drivers of pharmaceutical clinical trials in the United States" (2016) 13 
Clinical Trials 117. 
20  Medsafe "Generic Medicines and Bioequivalence" (March 2013) <www.medsafe.govt.nz>. 
21  Medsafe "Guideline on the Regulation of Therapeutic Products in New Zealand, Part 6: Bioequivalence of 
Medicines, Edition 2.0" (June 2015) <www.medsafe.govt.nz> at [1.1]. 
22  At [1.1]. 
23  Jerome Reichman "Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in the International Intellectual Property Law: 
The Case for a Public Goods Approach" (2009) 13 Marquette Intellectual Property L Rev 1 at 4–5. 
24  Medicines Act 1981, ss 23A and 23B. 
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approval. Since conducting clinical trials may not be economically feasible, data exclusivity can delay 
the entry of competition into the market.25  
In some cases data exclusivity will have no practical effect. This is because the data exclusivity 
period may run concurrently with the patent term, and thus generic versions of the patented drug 
cannot be marketed without infringing the patent. However, data exclusivity provides high 
commercial value where an inventor's patent becomes invalidated. Since data exclusivity is not 
affected by patent invalidation, it can still be an effective means of deterring the onset of competition 
in these situations.26  
III ARTICLE 18.50 OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AND MEASURES REQUIRED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE 
According to art 18.50.1(a) of the TPP:27 
If a Party requires, as a condition for granting marketing approval for a new pharmaceutical product, the 
submission of undisclosed test or other data concerning the safety and efficacy of the product, that Party 
shall not permit third persons, without the consent of the person that previously submitted such 
information, to market the same or a similar product on the basis of: (i) that information; or (ii) the 
marketing approval granted to the person that submitted such information, for at least five years from the 
date of marketing approval of the new pharmaceutical product in the territory of the Party. 
This restriction on the use of undisclosed test data in the regulatory approval process amounts to 
a requirement of five years' data exclusivity. In New Zealand the period of data exclusivity expires 
"on the date 5 years after the innovative medicine application to which that information relates is or 
was, as the case may be, received by the Minister".28 To ensure conformity with this article the 
Medicines Act 1981 may require amendment so that the data exclusivity period ends five years from 
the date that marketing approval is granted rather than five years from the date on which the 
application was received. This may result in a small extension to the data exclusivity period. For 
example, if three months lapsed between the date that the application was received and the date that 
approval was granted, then the five-year period of exclusivity would be longer by three months. 
Article 18.50.1(b) of the TPP ensures that a five-year term of data exclusivity would apply in 
respect of the use of overseas clinical data. Medsafe allows an analysis of bioequivalence to be 
performed between a generic pharmaceutical and an innovator product obtained from an overseas 
  
25  Reichman, above n 23, at 4–5. 
26  At 5. 
27  Emphasis added. 
28  Medicines Act 1981, s 23A. 
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market.29 The proviso is that "the overseas sourced innovator product must be shown, using a series 
of in vitro tests, to be the same as the innovator product approved in New Zealand".30 In such cases, 
a five-year term of data exclusivity would have to apply from the date of marketing approval.  
Article 18.50.2(a) requires parties to:31 
Apply paragraph 1, mutatis mutandis, for a period of at least three years with respect to new clinical 
information submitted as required in support of a marketing approval of a previously approved 
pharmaceutical product covering a new indication, new formulation or new method of administration …  
The Medicines Act limits the application of data exclusivity to "innovative medicine 
applications".32 This is defined as an application that refers to an active ingredient that has not 
previously been referred to in any other application.33 In order to comply with its TPP obligations 
New Zealand would have to introduce three years' data exclusivity in order to restrict the unauthorised 
use of undisclosed clinical information, which had previously been submitted in applications 
concerning new indications, formulations, or methods of administration of previously approved 
products. This three-year period would have to begin on the date that the marketing approval was 
granted.  
The New Zealand market for pharmaceuticals is very small on the global scale.34 Realistically, 
the length of data exclusivity in New Zealand is unlikely to affect investment in research overseas, 
and thus the availability of innovative pharmaceuticals in the future. However, extended terms of data 
exclusivity may delay or deter generics manufacturers from obtaining regulatory approval in New 
Zealand for their products. This could genuinely slow down the onset of competition within the New 
Zealand market, hindering the availability of cheaper drugs. The United States, with a substantial 
comparative advantage in pharmaceutical manufacture stands to benefit from protecting the profits of 
  
29  Medsafe, above n 21, at [1.3]. 
30  At [1.3] (emphasis omitted). 
31  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
32  Medicines Act 1981, s 23B. 
33  Section 23A. 
34  In 2012, the United States, European Union/European Economic Area and Japan accounted for 85 per cent of 
sales for the top 100 pharmaceuticals. See Evaluate Pharma "Pharmaceutical & Biotech Sales Analysis by 
Country: Top Drugs, Top Regions" (May 2014) <info.evaluategroup.com>. New Zealand had an estimated 
population of 4.51 million in 2014 compared with a global population of 7.3 billion in mid-2015. See Statistics 
New Zealand "National Population Projections: 2014(base)–2068" (28 November 2014) 
<www.stats.govt.nz>; and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables (Working Paper No 
ESA/P/WP241, 2015) at 1.  
 AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP'S DATA EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS  7 
 
its pharmaceutical sector. However, as a country with a small pharmaceutical industry, which largely 
relies on overseas imports, it is not in New Zealand's interest to increase the term of data exclusivity.  
Interestingly, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade reports that ratification 
of the TPP will not require any changes to New Zealand laws in respect of the provisions discussed.35 
Their view is that the TPP data exclusivity obligations "can be met without changes to policy settings 
or practice".36 However, it is difficult to see how this can be so when the TPP text is inconsistent with 
the Medicines Act and imposes new requirements. The Select Committee also reports that:37 
[The] TPP would also require New Zealand to provide five years' data protection to new small molecule 
(but not biologic) pharmaceutical products that contain a both new and a previously approved active 
ingredient. This would not require a change to New Zealand law but entails a loss of policy flexibility in 
the future for small molecule pharmaceuticals. 
This statement requires correction. In the case of applications for previously approved active 
ingredients, in other words applications for new uses or formulations, the term of data exclusivity 
imposed by the TPP is three, not five years. Moreover, a change in New Zealand law would be 
required to provide for this.  
In the case of biologics, which will be discussed later, the Committee notes that TPP obligations 
can be "met by current New Zealand policy settings and practice".38 Again, there are issues with this.  
The Select Committee's views appear to be represented in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement Amendment Bill under which there are no proposed changes to New Zealand's data 
exclusivity regime.39 This is surprising since the TPP's data exclusivity provisions are inconsistent 
with New Zealand law, and the very purpose of this Bill is "to align New Zealand's domestic law with 
certain obligations in the [TPP]".40 On the one hand, this response, or lack thereof, does seem to 
reduce some of the concerns regarding enhanced intellectual property protection. On the other hand, 
it is interesting that the New Zealand Government has not implemented these changes in this Bill. 
Perhaps they will do so sometime in the future. 
  
35  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, above n 1, at 79–80. 
36  At 79–80. 
37  At 79–80. 
38  At 79–80. 
39  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Bill 2016. 
40  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Bill 2016. 
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IV ARTICLE 18.51 OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AND MEASURES REQUIRED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE 
According to art 18.51, in the case of biologic medicines, members must comply with one of two 
options. The first option is to provide a term of data exclusivity of "at least eight years from the date 
of first marketing approval of that product". The second option is to provide protection of clinical trial 
data for at least five years, along with other measures to "provide effective market protection" and 
"deliver a comparable outcome in the market".41 
Under the Medicines Act no distinction is drawn between the term of data exclusivity afforded to 
drugs based on whether they contain a biologic entity or not.42 In order to determine whether the TPP 
provisions are consistent with New Zealand law it is first necessary to identify the meaning of the 
second option.  
A The Meaning of the Language of Art 18.51 
While the language of the first option is clear, the language used in the second option is inherently 
vague. This ambiguity suggests that the text is accommodating two contrary points of view. In other 
words it seems likely that the matter was intentionally left ambiguous in order for the parties to 
conclude their negotiations despite having an unresolved conflict of opinion. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that the United States has been clearly advocating for extended terms of data 
exclusivity for biologics.43 In contrast, other parties have staunchly defended their views on the need 
for shorter terms, doing so even as the treaty negotiations approached their final stages.44  
In interpreting the meaning of this language, the New Zealand Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Defence emphasised that the second option "must deliver a comparable outcome 
to the eight-year option".45 This seems consistent with the ordinary meaning of the language of the 
provision.46 However, they then conclude that:47 
  
41  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art 18.51. 
42  An active ingredient is defined as including "chemical and biological entities": Medicines Act 1981, s 23A.  
43  "In TPP, US Floats 12-year Data Period for Biologics, Flexibilities for Developing Countries" (27 November 
2013) Inside US Trade <https://insidetrade.com>. 
44  The Australian Minister of Trade and Investment was reported on 7 November 2015 as insisting that Australia 
had not moved "one iota" on the issue of data exclusivity for biologics and had protected the five-year rule. 
See "US senator's claims Australia is being greedy over trade deal rejected" The Guardian (online ed, London, 
7 November 2015). 
45  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, above n 1, at 10. 
46  Such an interpretation is consistent with the rules of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention. See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), art 31. 
47  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, above n 1, at 79. 
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The second option can be met by current New Zealand policy settings and practice. New Zealand already 
provides five years' data protection for biologics. This, together with measures like patent protection for 
biologics and the time for Medsafe's regulatory approval process, as well as other market circumstances, 
provide effective market protection for biologics in New Zealand.  
Although the data protection obligations in [the] TPP would be new obligations for New Zealand, as they 
can be met without changes to policy settings or practice they will not result in any additional costs for 
consumers or the medicines budget. 
In examining the meaning of the second option, the words "comparable outcome" read in light of 
the provision as a whole can be understood as a reference to the protection offered by the eight-year 
term. Thus, the language of the second option indicates that some form of action with the effect of 
preventing or deterring biosimilar market entry for a period of eight years is required. This could be 
achieved for example by having five years of data exclusivity, with the addition of three years of 
market exclusivity. However it is unrealistic to say that biologics will not require any further 
protection than that provided by the current five-year term.  
In response to the Select Committee's points, patents will not suffice as an additional protective 
measure if there is no valid patent in place. Likewise, where Medsafe's regulatory approval period is 
less than three years, the associated delays alone will not constitute comparable protection. For 
example, take a biologic drug that is not patented, where the regulatory approval process takes one 
year. If the term of data exclusivity lasted five years from the date that the drug was approved, then 
this would all add up to six years of protection, but not eight. The measures proposed by the Select 
Committee would not be sufficient to ensure a comparable outcome in such a situation.  
It may be that other member nations will accept New Zealand's interpretation of the TPP. 
However, one commentator has raised concerns that:48 
The legal language provides room for the United States to continue to pressure the other TPP countries to 
ensure that they keep biosimilars … off the market for eight years, in order to provide equivalent "effective 
market protection" and a "comparable outcome" to eight years of data protection. 
This is clearly less of a concern now that the United States has withdrawn from the Partnership, 
however there is still the risk that other countries will adopt such an approach. 
B Other Relevant TPP Clauses 
A biologic is defined in the TPP as "a product that is, or, alternatively, contains, a protein produced 
using biotechnology processes, for use in human beings for the prevention, treatment, or cure of a 
  
48  Deborah Gleeson "Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Australia's Intellectual Property 
Arrangements, The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, Intellectual Property and Access to Affordable 
Medicines" (24 December 2015) at 7. 
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disease or condition".49 This wide definition has been described as constraining government 
discretion.50 However, the language also provides some degree of flexibility since parties are not 
obliged to apply this provision to biologic products which are not protein based, or to protein based 
drugs that are created strictly via chemical synthesis. 
Article 18.51.3 also provides that the "parties shall consult after 10 years from the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement, or as otherwise decided by the Commission, to review the period of 
exclusivity." Concerns have been raised that "this could result in countries being pressured to provide 
market exclusivity for more products, or to lengthen the period of protection".51  
V SHOULD BIOLOGICS HAVE A LONGER DATA EXCLUSIVITY 
TERM? 
A  Small-Molecule Pharmaceuticals versus Biologics 
Traditional chemical drugs consist of a homogeneous array of small-molecules, with well-defined 
physical structures, usually manufactured in the laboratory.52 Such products embody the stereotypical 
representation of pharmaceuticals. In comparison, biologic drugs are generally composed of larger 
molecules, usually complex proteins, which are produced via biotechnological processes.53 They may 
consist of a heterogeneous mixture of proteins. This is typically the case if they have been derived 
from rDNA.54 Although the degree of complexity and size may vary substantially, biologics, as their 
name suggests, can be differentiated by their biologic origin.55 Such drugs are produced within cells, 
often through the use of rDNA methods, and then extracted and purified.56 The figure below provides 
a comparison of size and complexity between caffeine, a small-molecule drug with 24 atoms, and 
human growth hormone, a relatively small biologic protein hormone, but still one with over 3,000 
atoms.57 
  
49  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art 18.51.2. 
50  Gleeson, above n 48, at 7. 
51  At 7. 
52  Vincent Roth "Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?" (2013) 29 Santa Clara Computer 
& High Tech L J 249 at 255. 
53  Carolyn Castagna "Therapeutic Monoclonal Antibodies: The Dilemma of Delivering Affordable Biologics to 
Patients While Continuing to Incentivise Innovation" (2009) 82 Temple L Rev 1071 at 1072–1073. 
54  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation "The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Innovation in the Bioeconomy: 
The Need for 12 Years of Data Protection for Biologics" <www.bio.org> at 8. 
55  Castagna, above n 53, at 1072. 
56  At 1072. 
57  Image sourced from Roth, above n 52, at 255. 
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Biologic production techniques tend to be vastly more expensive than those used to produce small-
molecule chemical drugs.58 These expenses are reflected in the higher prices of biologics. Treatment 
costs in some cases can soar as high as USD 500,000 per year.59 Despite these sometimes staggering 
prices, the biologic market is experiencing massive growth. The industry began with the discovery of 
rDNA techniques in 1973, with the first biologic drug, recombinant human insulin gaining Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval in 1982.60 By 2012 biologics represented 20 per cent of all 
drugs on the US market and in 2011 alone the US drug development pipeline contained around 900 
new biologics.61 Early biologics were used to treat protein deficiencies and included proteins such as 
insulin for the treatment of diabetes and clotting factors for the treatment of haemophilia.62 
Monoclonal antibodies are a particularly new and innovative class of biologics. These are man-made 
  
58  At 255. 
59  One of the most expensive small-molecule drugs for arthritis costs around $300, while treatment for arthritis 
with the biologic Enbrel costs around $20,000 a year. Avastin a treatment for colon cancer costs around 
$100,000 a year while Cerezyme a biologic treatment for Gaucher disease costs between $200,000 and 
$500,000 a year. (All prices in USD). See Karen Tumulty and Michael Scherer "How Drug-Industry Lobbyists 
Won on Health Care" Time (online ed, 22 October, 2009).  
60  Roth, above n 52, at 254. 
61  At 254. 
62  Linfong Tzeng "Follow-On Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA" (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech L J 135 at 
136. 
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antibodies, which are designed to target bacteria, viruses and cancerous cells.63 Monoclonal 
antibodies present exciting possibilities to treat a wide range of conditions.64 As has been illustrated, 
biologic treatments bring us right to the frontiers of modern medicine, but this comes at often 
exorbitant prices.65  
B  Generics versus Biosimilars 
In the case of small-molecule pharmaceuticals, the entry of generic manufacturers into the market 
after patent expiry increases competition, which drives prices down.66 These generics are identical 
copies of the pioneer pharmaceuticals.67 They can be produced by competitors through chemical 
synthesis, and analytical tests can be conducted to verify that the active ingredients are identical to 
those in the pioneer drug.68 In terms of regulatory approval, once it has been established that both 
drugs contain identical active ingredients it can be assumed that they will have the same 
pharmacological effect.69 In such a situation, after data exclusivity periods expire, generic 
manufacturers can take advantage of an abbreviated regulatory approval process and need only 
establish bioequivalence between the generic and the pioneer drug.70  
Biosimilars can be thought of as generic versions of biologic drugs. However, there are key 
differences. Biologic production leads to unpredictability in the final structure of the biologic.71 This 
  
63  Key functions of antibodies include the neutralisation of bacterial toxins, the opsonisation of pathogens which 
thereby facilitates their ingestion and destruction by macrophages, and the activation of complement, a key 
response of the immune system. See Kenneth M Murphy Janeway's Immunobiology (8th ed, Garland Science, 
New York, 2012) at Figure 1.25. 
64  Castagna, above n 53, at 1076.  
65  Tumulty and Scherer, above n 59.  
66  Competition within small-molecule pharmaceutical markets has been reported as driving down prices by as 
much as 80 per cent in the 24 months following patent expiry. See Ernst Berndt and Murray Aitken "Brand 
Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 
Waxman-Hatch Legislation" (October 2010) NBER Working Papers <www.nber.org> at 19.  
67  This is essentially a requirement for regulatory approval under the generics pathway. "A generic medicine 
contains the same active ingredient (including different salts), in the same quantity as an innovator medicine". 
See Medsafe, above n 20. 
68  Benjamin Deadman and others "The synthesis of Bcr-Abl inhibiting anticancer pharmaceutical agents 
imatinib, nilotinib and dasatinib" (2013) 11 Organic Biomolecular Chemistry 1766. The authors discuss the 
various synthetic pathways, which have been developed for synthesising a selection of Brc-Abl tyrosine 
kinase inhibitors used in the treatment of chronic myelogenous leukemia. 
69  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 8. 
70  Medsafe, above n 20. 
71  Tzeng, above 62, at 138. 
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is because biologics are highly sensitive to their manufacturing process.72 Indeed, proteins produced 
via biotechnological methods are so sensitive to changes in the manufacturing process that the FDA 
will often require new evidence of safety whenever a biologics manufacturer changes an aspect of 
their manufacturing process.73 Moreover, due to the size and complexity of biologics it may be 
impossible to fully elucidate all the discrete structural differences between the biologic and the 
biosimilar.74 Modern scientific techniques allow for the determination of recombinant protein amino 
acid sequences.75 However it is much more difficult to analyse other aspects of a protein's structure: 
the process "is fraught with uncertainties that increase with the size and complexity of the protein 
itself".76 This means that biosimilar manufacturers may not know whether their product is identical 
to the reference biologic.  
This presents serious issues from a regulatory perspective. Even the most subtle differences 
between biologics can lead to variations in safety and efficacy parameters. For example, biologic 
drugs have the potential to elicit immune responses, where the body generates anti-drug antibodies 
(ADA) against the biologic drug.77 This can result in serious clinical consequences.78 Sometimes the 
ADA will neutralise biologic drugs by binding to specific sites, thus making the treatment less 
effective.79 Grave concerns also arise where the body's ADA neutralise endogenous counterparts of 
the biologic.80 Such "neutralizing ADA that are cross-reactive with the endogenous protein can cause 
significant safety concerns because they inhibit the inherent physiological pathway and can lead to a 
deficiency syndrome".81 
For example, when Johnson & Johnson commenced a new manufacture process for erythropoietin 
it did not expect to alter the biologic's clinical performance. However, Johnson & Johnson's Eprex 
  
72  Roth, above 52, at 275. 
73  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 9. 
74  Tzeng, above n 62, at 139. 
75  Medsafe "Medsafe position on biosimilar medicines" <www.medsafe.govt.nz> at 1. 
76  At 1. 
77  Gopi Shankar and others "Scientific and regulatory considerations on the immunogenicity of biologics" 
(2006) 24 Trends in Biotechnology 274 at 274. 
78  At 274. 
79  At 274. 
80  At 274. 
81  At 274. 
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triggered adverse immunological responses in some patients, and ultimately several died after 
developing pure red cell aplasia.82 
The very premise of generic approval is that products with the same active ingredients are the 
same, so there is no need to replicate clinical data.83 This theory starts to break down where the 
biosimilar is merely similar, or cannot be proved to be the same. In light of this Medsafe has stated 
that a mere demonstration of bioequivalence will not suffice for the regulatory approval of a 
biosimilar.84 Instead Medsafe applies an approach based on the clinical comparability of the two 
pharmaceuticals, which requires clinical and non-clinical studies.85 In particular the immunogenicity 
of a biosimilar must be thoroughly investigated and applicants must submit risk management plans, 
which may include post-marketing safety monitoring.86 An abridged evaluation procedure is still 
offered, but evidently the regulatory approval process will be more costly and time consuming.87 As 
an example of a comparative approach taken overseas, the FDA explains that:88 
A biological product may be demonstrated to be "biosimilar" if data show that the product is "highly 
similar" to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components and 
there are no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the reference product in 
terms of safety, purity and potency. 
Interestingly, despite the availability of this approval pathway, biosimilar manufacturers have 
encountered roadblocks in bringing their products to the United States market. As of 23 July 2016, 
the FDA had only approved two drugs under the biosimilar pathway: only one of them being 
commercially available.89 
  
82  Bryan Liang and Timothy Mackey "Emerging patient safety issues under health care reform: follow-on 
biologics and immunogenicity" (2011) 7 Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 489 at 490; and 
Biotechnology Innovation Organisation "Why Is Patient Safety a Concern in the Biosimilars Debate?" (27 
June 2016) <www.bio.org>. 
83  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 9. 
84  Medsafe, above n 75, at 1. 
85  At 1. 
86  At 3. 
87  At 1–4. 
88  Food and Drug Administration "Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009" (2 December 2016) <www.fda.gov>.  
89  Emma Court "These drugs could cut American health costs by $250 billion (if only we could take them)" (25 
July 2016) MarketWatch <www.marketwatch.com>. 
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C Do Biologic Pioneers Need More Intellectual Property Protection? 
In light of the changes outlined in the TPP, it is worth considering the underlying rationale behind 
the provisions. First, it can be argued that biologic patents are more difficult to enforce and thus are 
weaker. Therefore increased data exclusivity terms may be necessary to compensate for this 
deficiency. Assume that a pharmaceutical company is trying to enforce its patent. If the patented 
compound is a small-molecule it may be easier to show that a competitor's drug contains the identical 
compound and thus establish infringement of the patent.90 However, two functionally similar 
biologics may vary structurally and exhibit different properties solely due to differences in the 
manufacturing processes.91 In such cases a patent may not extend to cover structural variants of the 
protein and can be designed around.92 As the Biotechnology Innovation Organisation points out:93 
An inventor may have generated experimental evidence showing a protein with a particular sequence 
exhibits properties that make the protein useful. However, the inventor may not have tested variants of 
that protein. Without experimental data proving those variants also share the essential properties as the 
tested protein, a patent examiner usually will not grant the inventor rights extending to those variants. 
For these reasons small-molecule drug patents might offer better protection, simply because they 
are easier to enforce. It has also been suggested that a biosimilar could be sufficiently similar to the 
pioneer biologic that their manufacturers could exploit the benefits of accelerated approval pathways 
but still avoid patent infringement due to structural differences.94  
However, these claims do not go uncontested. The United States Federal Trade Commission holds 
the view that patent protection for biologics is adequate, particularly given the multitude of patents 
that may be in force at any given time:95 
Pioneer biologics are capable of being covered by numerous and varied patents, including manufacturing 
and technology platform patents. There is no evidence that patents claiming a biologic drug product have 
been, or are likely to be, designed around more frequently than those claiming small-molecule products. 
  
90  When the active ingredient of a drug is a small-molecule tests can be conducted to conclusively establish that 
the two compounds are identical. For example, basic spectroscopic analysis by NMR (nuclear magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy) or IR (infra-red spectroscopy) should allow the two compounds to be differentiated 
within the lab. 
91  Roth, above 52, at 275. 
92  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 17.  
93  At 17. 
94  Roth, above n 52, at 276. 
95  Pamela Jones Harbour "Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition: A Report by the Federal Trade Commission" 
(11 June 2009) United States of America Federal Trade Commission <www.ftc.gov> at 8.  
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A second argument which has been run is that the majority of biotech companies, in the United 
States market at least, are small start-ups which are dependent on private capital.96 On this basis, the 
prospect of strong intellectual property protection is necessary to stimulate private investment in these 
companies.97 In contrast traditional pharmaceutical companies have been described as "large, publicly 
traded companies that are capable of financing their own research and development without resorting 
to outside sources of capital".98 However, the position is not quite so clear-cut. In reality, many of the 
big players which dominate the pharmaceutical industry also manufacture and invest in biologics. In 
2012 for example, it was reported that "40% of all biotech products in clinical development were 
being developed by big pharma".99 It is misleading to consider the two markets in isolation.  
A third line of argument is that increased protection is necessary due to the particularly high 
development costs and risks of failure associated with biologics.100 Moreover, the few successful 
products created need to be sufficiently protected so that the developers can make enough profits to 
off-set the losses from their less successful endeavours.101 The central premise of these arguments is 
that there are insufficient incentives for innovation within this field.  
However, this proposition does not seem well founded. The biologics market is highly lucrative 
and is experiencing massive growth. As of February 2015 two of the market leaders, PDL BioPharma 
Inc and Gilead Sciences Inc, had net income margins over the last 12 months of 55.44 per cent and 
48.62 per cent respectively, and Gilead Sciences' revenue increased by 222 per cent in 2014 alone to 
reach a mammoth USD 24.89 billion.102 In 2011 alone, global sales for the biologics Remicade and 
  
96  Roth, above n 52, at 285; and Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 12. 
97  Stuart JH Graham and Ted Sichelman "Patenting by high technology entrepreneurs" in Shubha Ghosh and 
Robin Paul Malloy (eds) Creativity, Law and Entrepreneurship (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2011) 
156 at 170–172. 
98  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 12. 
99  Emily Waltz "It's official: biologics are pharma's darlings" (2014) 32 Nature Biotechnology 117. 
100  One study estimated the pre-approval costs of developing a biologic to be around USD 1.2 billion. See Joseph 
DiMasi and Henry Grabowski "The Costs of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?" (2007) 28 
Managerial and Decision Economics 469. Another study put the cost at USD 1.9 billion. See Erik Palmer 
"Conquering the complexities of biologics to get to biosimilars" (26 March 2013) Fierce Pharma 
Manufacturing <www.fiercepharma.com>. Biologics have also been estimated to have a higher risk of failure 
in phase three clinical trials than their small-molecule counterparts. See Henry Grabowski "Data Exclusivity 
for New Biological Entities" (June 2007) Duke University Department of Economics <www.econ.duke.edu>. 
101  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 12. 
102  Philip van Doorn "These are the most profitable Nasdaq biotech companies" (2 March 2015) MarketWatch 
<www.marketwatch.com>. 
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Avastin totalled USD 7.19 billion and USD 5.98 billion respectively.103 In 2010, in the United States, 
combined sales of the top 12 biologic products was around $30 billion.104 In the same year global 
sales of biologics amounted to $157 billion.105 The Nasdaq Biotechnology Index has risen 227 per 
cent from the end of 2011 until February 2015, compared with a 91 per cent rise in the Nasdaq 
Composite Index.106 This indicates substantial growth in biotechnology relative to other industries. 
Moreover, "while global spending on all medicines grew 24 percent from 2007 to 2012, spending on 
biologics grew 367 percent during the same period."107 If there is anyone to be concerned about, it is 
the patients. While the market is flourishing, healthcare systems are burdened with massive costs. In 
2013, the average daily cost of a biologic in the United States was $45 compared with $2 for small-
molecule drugs.108  
In any case it is hard to see how a five year term of data exclusivity for biologics in New Zealand 
would chill innovation in biotechnology overseas, particularly given the growth of the biologics 
market, its lucrative nature and the fact that the New Zealand market is relatively small.  
Another point is that the more complex biosimilar regulatory approval process means that 
manufacturers will probably incur relatively greater upfront costs in bringing their products to the 
market.109 Patients suffering from serious diseases may also be reluctant to participate in clinical trials 
when there is a chance that the biosimilar will not be effective. Rather, it is in their interest to opt for 
a course of treatment with the approved pioneer biologic.110 These factors collectively constitute a 
significant barrier to market entry for competitors in the biologics arena. 
Additionally, where biologic manufacturers do not disclose their manufacturing process, this 
presents a strong impediment to biosimilar market entry. As noted by one commentator:111 
[The non-disclosure of manufacturing process information] has not been an issue in the small-molecule, 
chemical world. Because of the simplicity of their molecular structures, different manufacturing processes 
  
103  Erwin Blackstone and Joseph Fuhr "The Economics of Biosimilars" (2013) 6 American Health and Drug 
Benefits 469 at 469. 
104  Andrew Bourgoin "What You Need to Know About the Follow-On Biologic Market in the US: Implications, 
Strategies, and Impact" (January 2011) <http://thomsonreuters.com>. 
105  Blackstone and Fuhr, above n 103, at 473. 
106  van Doorn, above n 102. 
107  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, above n 1, at 10. 
108  Blackstone and Fuhr, above n 103, at 469.  
109  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 9. 
110  Blackstone and Fuhr, above n 103, at 472. 
111  Roth, above n 52, at 289. 
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can still arrive at an identical compound, thus achieving structural identity. However, because of the size 
and complexity involved with biologics, not knowing how the product is made is an impediment in 
developing a biosimilar.  
The presence of these market barriers dilutes the strength of the arguments made for extending 
biologic data exclusivity periods.  
Furthermore, data exclusivity has been described as providing an incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in the research required to establish the safety and efficacy of a drug.112 The 
argument here seems to be that without such protection firms would lack the incentives to seek 
regulatory approval. This reasoning seems somewhat flawed since pharmaceutical companies have 
no choice but to obtain regulatory approval if they want to market their drugs and make any kind of 
profit at all. Every kind of incentive exists for manufacturers to get their drugs approved as quickly 
as possible. At any rate, biosimilar manufacturers, even under an accelerated approval pathway, will 
probably have to generate large amounts of safety and efficacy data. They should still derive some 
benefit from having access to existing clinical data. However, the argument that longer data 
exclusivity periods are required for biologics than for small-molecule drugs does not seem persuasive, 
since generics manufacturers should be able to "free-ride" to a much greater extent on existing clinical 
data than biosimilar manufacturers. 
It is possible to go further and suggest that biologics manufacturers should have less protection, 
since this would facilitate the entry of competition into the market. This argument is particularly 
relevant in the New Zealand context, where biologic drugs can be very expensive.113 
Additionally, intellectual property protections for pharmaceutical products have been becoming 
increasing comprehensive over the years, as the United States secures various TRIPS plus 
agreements.114 "With each new success, the pharmaceutical companies' demands have become more 
audacious."115 Therefore the arguments mounted by pharmaceutical companies and industry lobby 
groups must be considered with some scepticism, since they have an incentive to protect the profits 
of their industry. In light of the arguments presented for both sides it does not seem that the case for 
extended periods of exclusivity for biologics has been made out.  
  
112  Kristina Lybecker "When Patents Aren't Enough: Why Biologics Necessitate Data Exclusivity Protection" 
(2013–14) 40 Wm Mitchell L Rev 1427 at 1428; and Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 
3. 
113  In 2014, the biologic Humira was the most expensive drug funded by Pharmac, at $62.2 million. See Radio 
New Zealand "Massive savings claimed by drugs agency" (12 December 2014) <www.radionz.co.nz>. 
114  Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller "Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property Provisions of Recent 
US Free Trade Agreements" (7 February 2005) The World Bank Group <http://documents.worldbank.org>. 
115  Reichman, above n 23, at 7–8. 
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D Is Data Exclusivity an Appropriate Means of Compensating for the 
Alleged Deficiencies in the Patent System? 
Data exclusivity automatically applies upon regulatory approval. No application is required.116 
Patents however, require their holder to make an application and engage in costly litigation to 
safeguard their rights.117 A system where data exclusivity provides a substitute for some forms of 
intellectual property protection may reduce expenditure on litigation and applications. If biologics 
manufacturers come to rely on extended terms of data exclusivity rather than patents they will not 
have to incur these expenses. Such savings could theoretically be diverted towards innovation.  
Unfortunately, these benefits come at a price. Data exclusivity forces competitors wishing to 
obtain regulatory approval during the relevant period to carry out all their own clinical trials, rather 
than follow an abbreviated approval pathway. This is a gross waste of resources. Moreover, serious 
ethical concerns are raised by unnecessarily experimenting on humans and animals.118 Clinical testing 
involves using a control group of sick patients, some of whom will receive a control instead of vital 
lifesaving treatment.119 While these ethical concerns could be reduced by using a proven treatment as 
the control for the clinical stages, this adds further cost.  
One view might be that data exclusivity encourages pharmaceutical companies to conduct further 
trials, thus increasing the likelihood of relevant discoveries. However, it seems doubtful that repeating 
clinical trials would actually yield a higher probability of new discoveries, compared with the 
probability of innovation resulting from diverting those same resources towards a project of one's 
choice.  
Patent law on the other hand has the advantage of incentivising the disclosure of information, 
which enhances the public domain and allows competitors to build on the efforts of others to design 
even better innovations.120 Data exclusivity has the opposite effect, hindering the dissemination of 
  
116  Roth, above n 52, at 281. 
117  In 2000, USD 4 billion alone was spent on patent litigation in the United States: at 281. 
118  Clinical trials involve the ascertainment of drug therapeutic indexes and immunogenicity properties. Patients 
may be exposed to some risk while these parameters are being investigated.  
119  Frampton and Holt, above n 14. 
120  See the judgment of Story J in Pennock v Dialogue 27 US 1 (1829) at 13: "While one great object [of patents 
is], by holding out a reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for 
a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was 'to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts;' and this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and 
vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible; having a due regard to the rights of the inventor." See 
also Frankel, above n 11, at 391: "The rationale that is used to justify strong patent protection is that patents 
encourage the flow of scientific and technological invention and discourage trade secrets." 
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knowledge during the period of exclusivity.121 Thus, as a matter of principle the extension of data 
exclusivity regimes should not be encouraged to compensate for deficiencies in the patent system 
where and when they arise. A system of data exclusivity replaces patents with secrets and undermines 
the social contract foundation for patent law.122 If the protection offered by patents is deemed 
insufficient for whatever reason, it is better to strengthen that protection.  
E Will an Increased Term of Data Exclusivity for Biologics Impact 
Patients? 
It has been argued that "the generic drug business model is largely inapplicable to biosimilars".123 
This is because while generic small-molecule pharmaceuticals are relatively easy to manufacture, 
biosimilar manufacturers face massive barriers to market entry which will deter the onset of 
competition, resulting in higher prices.124 The biosimilar regulatory approval process is also much 
more complex and the cost of biosimilar manufacturing facilities can be in the order of several hundred 
million dollars.125 One analyst has predicted the development of a typical biosimilar product to take 
eight to ten years at a cost of USD 100–200 million.126 In stark contrast the development of a small-
molecule generic may only take three to five years, at a mere cost of $1–5 million.127 As a result when 
competitors enter the biologics market, the cost savings to patients should be lower relative to those 
experienced in the small-molecule pharmaceutical market. Competitors simply cannot offer huge cost 
savings if they need to recoup the enormous expenses incurred in bringing their products to the market.  
Despite this negative outlook, significant cost reductions have resulted from the approval of some 
biosimilars in Europe. The onset of biosimilar competition for erythropoietin, used to regulate the 
production of red blood cells, saw prices fall by 36 per cent in Austria, 81 per cent in Croatia, 55 per 
cent in Germany and 13 per cent in Sweden.128 Likewise, biosimilar production of granulocyte 
  
121  In order to take advantage of data exclusivity the test data must be undisclosed. If the data has been publicly 
disclosed then the protection conferred by data exclusivity becomes redundant. 
122  This point was developed in discussion with Professor Susy Frankel, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Faculty of Law.  
123  Biotechnology Innovation Organisation, above n 54, at 10. 
124  At 9–10. 
125  At 9–10. 
126  Sumanth Kambhammettu "The European Biosimilars Market: Trends and Key Success Factors" (27 October 
2008) <www.obbec.com>. 
127  Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions "Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007" (25 June 2008) Congressional Budget Office 
<www.cbo.gov>. 
128  IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics "Assessing Biosimilar Uptake and Competition in European 
Markets" (October 2014) <www.imshealth.com> at 19. 
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colony-stimulating factor, used to accelerate recovery from neutropenia in some cancer patients, 
resulted in price decreases of 79 per cent in Bulgaria, 22 per cent in France, 50 per cent in Norway 
and 40 per cent in Sweden.129 The figure below illustrates some of the price reductions resulting from 
biosimilar market entry in Europe.  
Figure 3. Biosimilar Price Reductions in Europe130 
An overall analysis of the literature shows that estimates of cost savings from competition in the 
American and European biologic markets range from 10–50 per cent.131 Some other commentators 
have estimated that in Europe, biosimiliars can offer discounts of 25 per cent or more.132 In general 
however, these price reductions are not as significant as those observed in small-molecule markets.133 
However, when a medication costs millions per year to fund, even a small per cent decrease in its 
price is substantial.  
  
129  At 19. 
130  Sourced from Court, above n 89. 
131  Andrew Mulcahy, Zachary Predmore and Soeren Mattke "The Cost Savings Potential of Biosimilars in the 
United States" (2014) Rand Corporation <www.rand.org> at 4.  
132  Henry Grabowski, Rahul Guha and Maria Salgado "Biosimilar Competition: Lessons from Europe" (2014) 
13 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 99 at 99–100. 
133  Competition within small-molecule pharmaceutical markets has been reported as driving down prices by as 
much as 80 per cent in the 24 months following patent expiry. See Berndt and Aitken, above n 66, at 19. 
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Additionally, even when biosimilars do reach the market, doctors may be reluctant to accept them 
as substitutes.134 The risks of adverse immunological consequences probably play a part in these 
decisions.135 Thus, biosimilars may take time to gain acceptance, further delaying the onset of 
effective competition.  
This said, the availability of biosimilars has had a positive effect on increasing access to medicines 
in New Zealand. The first biosimilar to be accepted in New Zealand was Zarzio, in 2012. This is a 
medication designed to boost leukocyte cell counts in patients undergoing chemotherapy. According 
to Pharmac, the effect of competition was obvious. Pharmac was able to take advantage of cost savings 
and provide wider access to the drug.136 Likewise, in 2014, once biosimilar versions of infliximab 
became available overseas, Pharmac was able to use its enhanced bargaining power to negotiate a 30 
per cent price reduction with the supplier of the original biologic.137 This is significant given that 
current spending on this drug is $15 million a year and growing rapidly.138  
Against this background it can be seen how extending the period of data exclusivity for biologics 
could help delay the onset of competition. These costs would be passed on to Pharmac and the New 
Zealand taxpayer. Ultimately, delaying the onset of competition will compromise Pharmac's ability 
to fund medicines for the treatment of those in need.  
Enhanced intellectual property protections for biologics is beneficial to the United States economy 
since they have a strong comparative advantage in this field.139 There is also substantial biologics 
innovation taking place in the European Union and, to a lesser extent, in Japan.140 However, since 
New Zealand is dependent on the import of biologics from overseas, this means that the harmful 
effects on access to medicines cannot be rationalised under the guise of protecting New Zealand 
  
134  "Pharmaceuticals: Going large" The Economist (online ed, Chicago, 30 December 2014) 
<www.economist.com>. 
135  Federal Trade Commission "Emerging Healthcare Issues: Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition" (June 
2009) <www.ftc.gov>. 
136  Pharmac "Biosimilar filgrastim, More for less – the biosimilar filgrastim story" (10 December 2015) 
<www.pharmac.govt.nz>. 
137  Infliximab is used to treat rheumatoid arthritis, inflammatory bowel diseases and psoriasis. See Pharmac 
"Pharmac secures significant savings for DHBs on biologic drug" (4 December 2014) 
<www.pharmac.govt.nz>. 
138  Pharmac, above n 137. 
139  China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment R&D-based Pharmaceutical Association 
Committee, the Biotechnology Innovation Organisation and the Boston Consulting Group "Building a World-
Class Innovative Therapeutic Biologics Industry in China" (January 2013) Biotechnology Innovation 
Organisation <www.bio.org> at 8–9. 
140  In 2010 all 31 top biologic products with sales over USD 1 billion were developed in the United States and 
Europe: at 8. 
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innovators. The real reason for the TPP's data exclusivity provisions is to extend and protect the profits 
of United States pharmaceutical companies. Now that the United States has left the TPP, these 
justifications are weaker than ever before.  
VI ARTICLE 18.50.3 OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
A Interpretation of Art 18.50.3 
Article 18.50.3 holds that, notwithstanding arts 18.50.1, 18.50.2 and 18.51 (Biologics), "a Party 
may take measures to protect public health in accordance" with the Doha Declaration.141 This prompts 
the question, what can TPP members actually do to protect public health? In answering this question 
it is necessary to examine whether New Zealand's current exemptions to regulatory data protection 
under s 23C of the Medicines Act are consistent with the TPP. The two key issues that arise in this 
interpretation process are the meaning of "measures" and the meaning of "public health".  
In interpreting any international treaty, it is appropriate to have reference to the customary rules 
of interpretation of international law as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.142 
This treaty holds that:143 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. 
B  The Meaning of "Public Health" 
The process of interpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention logically begins with the 
plain meaning in its context.144 In order to ascertain the plain or ordinary meaning of "public health" 
reference can be made to the dictionary.145 Public health is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary 
as "The health of the population as a whole, especially as monitored, regulated, and promoted by the 
state".146 It is also defined by the World Health Organisation as "all organized measures (whether 
  
141  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (signed 4 February 2016), art 18.50.3. 
142  Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais "Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement" (2013) 
46 VJTL 1149 at 1166. 
143  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n 46, art 31.1. 
144  Susy Frankel "WTO Application of 'the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law' to 
Intellectual Property" (2006) 46 Va J Intl 365 at 386. 
145  Frankel and Gervais, above n 142, at 1172. The authors refer to the dictionary as part of the process of 
ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the text. 
146  Oxford English Dictionary "public health, n." <www.oed.com>. 
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public or private) to prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life among the population as a 
whole".147  
These definitions are silent on the issue of how serious a matter must be before it concerns the 
health of the "population as a whole" as opposed to that of the individual or a group of individuals. At 
this stage it is appropriate to refer to the context and purpose of the treaty. As Frankel and Gervais 
note: "The structure of Article 31.1 [of the Vienna Convention] is precisely that the context and object 
and purpose of the treaty are part of the ordinary meaning exercise." Rather than changing the ordinary 
meaning, context and purpose "are tools to locate or discern the ordinary meaning and inform proper 
interpretation".148 
Looking at the TPP, there is a further reference to public health in art 18.6.1, which holds, inter 
alia, that: 
… the Parties affirm that this Chapter can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of each Party's right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines 
for all. Each Party has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency. 
The language of this provision seems to indicate that it was intended to offer interpretive guidance 
in ascertaining the meaning of subsequent "public health provisions". It is at the start of the chapter 
and it provides interpretive guidance. Thus it is appropriate to refer to this section as part of the wider 
context.149 Within this section the words "public health" are followed by references to "national 
emergencies" and "circumstances of extreme urgency". The use of these words colours the meaning 
of "public health" in a restrictive fashion, such that it may be understood to refer to situations of 
widespread and serious public health issues, such as epidemics, but perhaps not serious obscure 
diseases or conditions, and certainly not common ailments.  
In terms of the object and purpose of the provisions at issue, the references within arts 18.6.1 and 
18.50.3 make it clear that consistency with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health is one 
of the underlying purposes behind art 18.50.3. Thus the Doha Declaration itself should form an 
integral part of the interpretive background, against which the words "public health" must be 
understood. The Doha Declaration begins with the words: "We recognize the gravity of the public 
  
147  Capital Area Public Health Network "What is Public Health?" <www.capitalareaphn.org>. 
148  Frankel and Gervais, above n 142, at 1169–1170. 
149  This approach is in accordance with the Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
above n 46, art 31.1. 
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health problems afflicting many developing and least developed countries, especially those resulting 
from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics."150 
Here "public health" is used in the context of references to epidemics affecting developing 
countries. This suggests that one purpose of the provision at issue is to allow developing countries to 
facilitate access to medicines in order to manage epidemics. To ensure consistency with this purpose 
"public health" should certainly include health issues that affect a large portion of the public, such 
that they could be classified as a matter of widespread concern.  
However, while "public health" should be read as including epidemics, it should also be open to 
member nations to define public health issues more widely, if their governments see fit to do so. This 
is because the Doha Declaration also provides that: "Each member has the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency".151 
What this suggests is that a purpose of the Doha Declaration is to ensure that TRIPS members 
have the individual autonomy to determine what health matters are sufficiently serious that measures 
can be taken to protect public health, at the expense of intellectual property rights.152  
The only way to give effect to this purpose would be to interpret the meaning of "public health" 
widely and generously so that members have the discretion to take measures to protect "public health" 
where appropriate. This conclusion is supported by reference to the TRIPS document itself.  
The reason for reference to TRIPS itself is because the TPP provides that members "may take 
measures to protect public health in accordance with: (a) the Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health".153 
The Doha Declaration in turn provides that:154 
In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, 
in its objectives and principles. 
  
150  Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
(adopted 14 November 2001), art 1. 
151  Article 5(c). 
152  Such measures could include granting compulsory licences, even though this would undermine intellectual 
property rights. 
153  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art 18.50.3. 
154  Doha Declaration, above n 150, art 5(a). 
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Accordingly, the interpreter can refer directly to the principles and objectives of TRIPS in interpreting 
the words "public health" since these references make it clear that the principles and objectives of 
TRIPS form part of the wider interpretive context.  
The principles of TRIPS are referred to in art 8, which provides that: "Members may, in 
formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health 
and nutrition".155 
"Public health" read in this context is not coloured in any restrictive manner. In fact, the open-
textured nature of this provision confers a wide discretion on members in their interpretation of the 
language. This reasoning supports the conclusion reached above.  
C  The Meaning of "Measures" 
If one reads the word "measures" in its wider context, the words "a Party may take measures to 
protect public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration" immediately suggests the inclusion of 
the text of the Doha Declaration as part of the interpretive background.156  
The Doha Declaration in turn provides that "Each member has the right to grant compulsory 
licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted."157 If the 
word "measures" is read in light of this background it can be logically understood as referring to 
actions with a similar effect, in terms of their ability to alleviate any public health issues which are 
exacerbated by the protection of intellectual property rights. On this basis, measures with a similar 
effect to compulsory licences should be available in the context of data exclusivity regimes.  
Compulsory licences may be granted by governments to allow generic manufacturers to produce 
on-patent drugs without being in breach of patent.158 An equivalent measure in the data exclusivity 
context would be for governments to give specific competitors a licence to use regulatory approval 
data. This would have the effect of encouraging the onset of competition. This interpretation does not 
necessarily mean that the measures available are limited to the issuance of licences. This is just one 
option that would seem to be available.  
D Section 23C of the Medicines Act and Art 18.50.3 
Overall, it seems that the New Zealand Government would have the discretion to provide 
competitors with a licence to use the inventor's regulatory approval data in order to more easily obtain 
  
155  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1869 UNTS 299 (signed 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995), art 8. 
156  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art 18.50.3. 
157  Doha Declaration, above n 150, art 5(b). 
158  World Trade Organisation "Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS" (2006) <www.wto.org>. 
 AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP'S DATA EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS  27 
 
marketing approval for their generic or biosimilar versions of a drug. The New Zealand Government 
should also be afforded a certain degree of discretion in determining when art 18.50.3 is engaged.  
Under the Medicines Act confidential supporting information may be used without consent, for 
the purpose of determining whether to grant an application for a pharmaceutical "if that disclosure or 
use is, in the opinion of the Minister, necessary to protect the health or safety of members of the 
public".159 This discretion granted under the Medicines Act is consistent with the requirements 
imposed by the TPP, provided that the discretion is exercised reasonably.  
VII ARTICLE 18.54 OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
This article provides that data exclusivity provisions will still have effect if they continue to be in 
force after the term of the patent has expired.160 This provision simply ensures that the practical 
purpose of data exclusivity is not circumvented, since it is in such cases where the relevant patent has 
expired that data exclusivity has its true commercial value. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The continued supply of new generic and biosimilar pharmaceuticals into the New Zealand market 
should allow Pharmac to facilitate wider access to life saving treatments. However, the language of 
the TPP imposes an extension of the terms of data exclusivity for both biologics and small-molecule 
pharmaceuticals. These provisions have the potential to impede access to medicines by delaying the 
entry of competition into the market. In particular, the true rationale behind the biologics provisions 
appears to be the protection of American corporate profits, rather than the stimulation of innovation. 
Clearly, these provisions are not in New Zealand's interest as a net importer of pharmaceuticals. 
However, the extent of the harm is somewhat mitigated by art 18.50.3 which would allow the Minister 
of Health some discretion to issue compulsory licences for the use of protected clinical trial data. 
Moreover, despite the stark inconsistencies between the language of the TPP and New Zealand law, 
the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has underplayed the significance of the 
imminent changes. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the TPP provisions will actually become 
incorporated into New Zealand law or whether they will stand as a relic of American corporate 
interests.  
 
  
  
159  Medicines Act 1981, s 23C(1)(a)(ii). 
160  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art 18.54. 
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